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 A B S T R A C T  
This research empirically re-tests the effects of auditor reputation, client’s financial 
condition, and potential intensive economy on artificial auditor rotation. The issue of 
audit quality is still interesting for the researchers to empirically. Auditors are de-
manded to execute their profession independently. To maintain their being indepen-
dent, this profession is regulated in the Decree by the Minister of Finance No. 
17/PMK.01/2008 on public accountant service. It is mandatory for auditor rotation in 
that regulation and this is interesting to study more profoundly because in Indonesia 
this phenomenon of artificial rotation is found. Artificial auditor rotation indicates a 
condition in which, conceptually, there has been a change of the auditor but substan-
tially the relationship between the auditor and the client is still going on. This research 
uses sample of companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2002-2011, by purpo-
sive sampling technique. The analysis of the research was done using logistic regres-
sion. The results of the research show that auditor reputation affects auditor rotation. 
Yet, company’s financial condition and potential incentive economy do not affect 
auditor rotation. This research is expected to deepen the concept of audit quality, whe-
reas in practice it is expected to provide inputs for regulating auditor rotation. Audi-
tors are expected to show real auditor rotation.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini akan menguji kembali secara empiris pengaruh reputasi auditor, 
kondisi keuangan klien dan insentif ekonomi potensial terhadap rotasi semu auditor. 
Isu tentang kualitas auditor masih menarik untuk diungkapkan dalam penelitian 
empiris. Auditor dituntut dapat melaksanakan profesinya secara independen. Untuk 
menjaga independensi, profesi ini diatur dalam Peraturan Menteri Keuangan No. 
17/PMK.01/2008 tentang jasa akuntan publik. Kewajiban rotasi auditor dalam 
aturan tersebut menarik untuk dikaji lebih mendalam karena di Indonesia terdapat 
fenomena rotasi semu auditor. Rotasi semu auditor menunjukkan suatu kondisi 
bahwa secara konseptual telah terjadi pergantian auditor, namun secara riil hubun-
gan antara auditor dan klien masih tetap berlangsung. Penelitian ini menggunakan 
sampel perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2002-2011, den-
gan teknis purposive sampling. Analisis penelitian dengan pendekatan regresi logis-
tik. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa reputasi auditor berpengaruh pada rotasi 
auditor. Sedangkan kondisi finansial perusahaan dan insentif ekonomi potensial 
tidak berpengaruh pada rotasi auditor. Penelitian ini diharapkan dapat memperda-
lam konsep tentang kualitas audit, dan secara praktis diharapkan dapat memberikan 
masukan tentang pengaturan rotasi auditor. Rotasi auditor seharusnya dapat me-
nunjukkan rotasi secara riil pergantian auditor.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Even though there have been many studies on au-
ditor rotation, only a few have uncovered the exis-
tence of artificial auditor rotation in Indonesia. This 
research attempts to discover the effects of auditor 
reputation, client‟s financial condition, and poten-
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tial intensive economy on artificial auditor rotation. 
In Indonesia, there has been regulation on manda-
tory auditor rotation; however, the phenomenon of 
artificial auditor rotations still exists. In this case, 
artificial rotation shows a condition in which, con-
ceptually, there has been a change of the auditor, 
but substantially the relationship between the audi-
tor and the client is still going on (Junaidi et al. 
2012, Junaidi 2014). That condition is suspected that 
either the auditor or the client tries to keep their 
working partnership. In addition, the relationship 
between auditor and client is a reciprocal relation-
ship. Therefore, it is very possible that there exist 
reciprocal influence(s) between both parties. Artifi-
cial auditor rotation in Indonesia indicates that au-
ditor and client want a long-term contract. Thus, it 
is important to empirically uncover some condi-
tions that influence auditor rotation. 
The issue related to audit quality is interesting 
for the researchers to study empirically since audi-
tor as an independent party is demanded to run 
their business by prioritizing the aspect of inde-
pendence. Auditor independence is a mental atti-
tude which has to be owned by every auditor in 
handling their roles as a professional. To maintain 
audit quality, government published regulations 
that bond auditor and partner for running their 
business. Government published Decree of the 
Ministry of Finance No. 423/KMK.06/2002, which 
was changed into Decree of Ministry of Finance No. 
359/KMK.06/2003 that obliged companies to limit 
the auditor assignment period within 5 years and 
the public accountant within 3 years. That decree 
was then revised by Decree of the Minister of 
Finance No. 17/PMK.01/2008 on public accountant 
service which limited the auditor assignment pe-
riod within 6 years and public accountant within 3 
years. Not only to regulate auditor and public ac-
countant, had it also regulated foreign audit firm 
(foreign auditor). Thus, according to the regulation, 
mandatory auditor rotation must be done after the 
duration of the relationship period ends. Until to-
day, the issues on mandatory auditor rotations still 
become a concern, especially of professional bodies 
of public accountant and stakeholders. 
The supporters of mandatory auditor rotation 
assumed that the longer the relation between auditor 
and client, the bigger possibility of auditor indepen-
dence to get lesser, because in a long period, over-
familiarity between the auditor and client is likely to 
happen. Jackson et al. (2008) and Carey and Simnett 
(2006) find that there are negative relations between 
audit partner tenure and the tendency of going con-
cern opinion giving. Junaidi et al. (2012, 2014) shows 
that auditor tenure has negative effect on the ten-
dency of going concern opinion giving. It shows that 
the longer the duration of auditor-client relationship, 
the less independent the auditor will be. On the oth-
er hands, the opponents of mandatory auditor rota-
tion claim that the longer the duration of auditor-
client relationship, the more competent the auditor 
will be, and as a result, the audit quality will also 
increase. The researches done by Geiger and Raghu-
nandan (2002), Myers et al. (2003), Johnson et al. 
(2002) figure out that audit and financial reporting, 
and auditor tenure have positive relation. 
Auditor reputation reflects audit quality which 
is measured by the size of the auditor. Regulator 
and small auditor state that auditor size does not 
influence audit quality and thus it must be irrele-
vant to choose the auditor. However, DeAngelo 
(1981a) contends that audit quality cannot be apart 
from the size of the auditor, even when at the be-
ginning, the auditor has the same technological 
skill. The bigger the auditor, the bigger the quality 
supply will be given. Some studies have tested 
whether audit quality which is measured by audi-
tor‟s brand name has positive relation(s) with audit 
quality. Auditor with high quality (Big N) can 
detect profit management since they have enough 
knowledge and are able to prevent opportunistic 
action(s) on profit management by the client (Beck-
er et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999). 
The potential intensive economy is suspected 
to be a factor that influences the duration of audi-
tor-client relationship. Certain opportunistic audi-
tors with their individual nature do not want to 
lose potential income if they lose the client(s). For 
example, Hartadi (2009) states that the fee has sig-
nificant effect on audit quality. Hoitash et al. (2007) 
also find the evidence that when auditor is nego-
tiating with the management about the amount of 
fee which has to be paid by the management as the 
payment of the auditor‟s work, there is a big possi-
bility of having been reciprocal concession which 
certainly will reduce the quality of the audited re-
ports. This action surely leads to the action of sacri-
ficing professionalism, in which that reciprocal 
concession will reduce the interests on audit quality 
maintenance. 
Furthermore, Schwactz & Menon (1985) and 
Nasser et al. (2006) find that companies which face 
financial distress will likely change their auditor 
rather than companies which do not. Yet, Prastiwi 
and Wilsya (2009) in their research state that com-
pany‟s financial distress has nothing to do with 
auditor rotation. The researches done by Sinason et 
al. (2001), Setyorini and Ardiati (2006) state that 
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financial condition has no effect on auditor rota-
tion. Companies which face financial distress want 
to be audited by the same auditor in long tenure 
since the auditor has better understanding on the 
companies‟ financial conditions. 
This research is expected to uncover the effects 
of auditor reputation, client‟s financial condition, 
and potential intensive economy which are sus-
pected as factors that influence auditor rotation. 
The results of this research are expected to be use-
ful for the regulator, in this case Indonesian Public 
Accountant Institute, as the bases to regulate audi-
tor rotation. The considerations of auditor rotation 
in Indonesia suppose to really reflect real rotation, 
and not the artificial one. It means, the regulation 
which is created has to be able to effectively bond 
the duration of auditor-client relationship. Fur-
thermore, this research is expected to be useful as 
the bases of auditor‟s considerations to keep main-
taining their audit quality as what is regulated on 
audit standard. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Audit Quality 
Audit quality is probability that the auditor will 
uncover the breach and report the breach (DeAnge-
lo 1981b). Audit quality is probability that the audi-
tor will not issue an unqualified report for state-
ments containing material errors (Lee et al. 1999). 
Peecher and Piercey (2008) state that audit quality 
is probability of an auditor to find and report viola-
tion(s) of the client‟s accounting system. Probability 
of the finding depends on auditor technical capabil-
ity and auditor independence. Independence is an 
ethic component that has to be maintained by the 
public accountant. Independence means the auditor 
must be honest, have conviction, and not take any 
side of certain party‟s interests since the job is done 
for public. 
Coram et al. (2008) state that audit quality is 
the possibility of an auditor to find unintention-
al/intentional error from company‟s financial re-
port, and the possibility of the finding(s) to be re-
ported and given in their audit opinion(s). Audit 
quality depends on auditor technical capability 
which is represented by experiences and profes-
sional education, and auditor independence in 
maintaining mental attitude. Furthermore, Peecher 
and Piercey (2008) state that audit quality is proba-
bility of an auditor to find and report violation(s) of 
the client‟s accounting system. Probability of the 
finding depends on auditor technical capability and 
auditor independence. 
Auditor Service Providing 
To maintain audit quality, government has pub-
lished Decree of Ministry of Finance No. 
423/KMK.06/2002, which was changed into Decree 
of Ministry of Finance No. 359/KMK.06/2003. The 
regulation states that general service on client‟s 
financial report can be done by an auditor within 5 
years in succession and by a partner within 3 years 
in succession. That decree was then revised with 
Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 17 of 2008. 
The second part of the regulation explains about 
the limitation of auditor service period, in this case 
general audit service on financial reports as an enti-
ty, as what is written on Article 2 Verse (1) the let-
ter “a” done by an auditor is at most within 6 years 
in succession and by a partner is at most within 3 
years in succession. 
Not only to regulate auditor and partner, has 
the regulation also regulated foreign audit firm 
(foreign auditor). Foreign audit firm is a foreign 
professional service firm that has a license from the 
authority in the country to do at least an auditing 
business at least on general auditing of financial 
reports. Practically, auditor is allowed to affiliate 
with foreign auditor in Indonesia. In relation with 
auditor and partner rotation, there has been clear 
regulation in Indonesia but in fact there is no clear 
regulation on foreign auditor. Because of that, prac-
tically, to fulfill the regulation of mandatory rota-
tion, auditor changes its name or changes the part-
ner, but still affiliate with the same foreign auditor 
in practice. 
On April 6, 2015, government had published 
Government Regulation No. 20 of 2015 on Public 
Accountant Practice (President RI, 2015) which was 
further regulation of Law No. 5 of 2011 on Public 
Accountant. In relation with the regulation on pub-
lic accountant service rotation, it was also regulated 
in the Article 11 PP 20/2015, of which in Article 11 
verse (1) it is explained that: the audit service on 
historical financial information as what is meant in 
Article 10 Verse (1) the letter “a” to a certain entity 
by a Public Accountant is limited to be at most 
within 5 (five) years in succession. 
 
Auditor Rotation 
Quality of financial reporting, auditor indepen-
dence, objectivity, and professional skepticism be-
come interesting issues in relation with the regula-
tion of auditor rotation. Until this very day, manda-
tory auditor rotation still becomes a hot debatable 
topic. Pros and cons about whether or not manda-
tory auditor rotation is compulsory keep going 
with their own empirical evidences on the impor-
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tance and the unimportant of the rotation. Daugh-
erty (2013) states that comments on mandatory au-
ditor rotation are mainly based on issues of client 
familiarity decreasing, audit cost increasing, regula-
tions, and competition between auditors. 
 
Arguments Which Support Mandatory Auditor 
Rotation 
Mauts and Sharaf (1961: 231) state that auditor has 
to realize various conditions which tend to influ-
ence their attitude and thus gradually decrease 
their independence. Threats on auditor indepen-
dence are not only there in reporting, but are also 
potentially there in assessment processes done dur-
ing the auditing (Dopuch et al. 2003, Bazerman et 
al. 1997). Because of that, it is suspected that the 
relation between auditor and client in a long period 
can influence auditor independence and objectivity. 
Specific argument on the consequence of indepen-
dence which decreases because of a long period of 
tenure is auditor may give up on pressure given by 
the client in a situation of conflict in auditing, and 
in extreme term, the possibility of over-familiarity 
will cause collusion between the auditor and the 
client (McLaren 1958). 
Supporters of mandatory auditor rotation 
show that audit quality will increase as a result of 
client familiarity decreasing. Nagy (2005) finds the 
evidence that auditor tenure has negative relation 
with audit quality. Furthermore, Jennings et al. 
(2006) using experimental approaches by analyzing 
49 of judges‟ responses who attended advance 
course in National College Yudisial, finds the evi-
dence of perceptions on auditor independence 
which can be increased by strengthening company 
management and auditor rotation. More, Fargher 
and Liwei (2008) find the evidence that in the be-
ginning of auditor tenure, the quality of accounting 
policy decreases, but when there is an auditor rota-
tion, the quality of accounting policy increases. 
Daugherty et al. (2013) have done a survey on 
direct and indirect effect of partner rotation on au-
dit quality. The survey was done on 370 partners in 
14 public accountant firms with 46 percent level of 
response. The result shows that partner regards 
mandatory auditor rotation as independence in-
creasing both in fact and appearance. Independence 
in fact is related to mental attitude of the auditor, 
and independence in appearance is related to oth-
ers‟ perceptions on auditor independence, so that it 
has positive effects on audit quality. However, the 
partners of participants agree that certain know-
ledge on clients will be lost as a result of the rota-
tion (decrease audit quality), and the duration of 
auditor tenure produce higher audit quality. Audit 
quality will have negative effects when core mem-
bers of the team which have particular knowledge 
on the client sign out from the audit team (Daugh-
erty et al. 2013). 
Mandatory auditor rotation is based on 2 as-
sumptions: (1) long term auditor-client relationship 
will interfere auditor independence and capability 
to be neutral and objective, and (2) mandatory au-
ditor rotation will overcome the problem(s) (if ex-
ist) related to long duration of relationship period 
between the auditor and the client (Jones et al. 
2012). Junaidi et al. (2012, 2014) tested the effects of 
auditor tenure on audit quality which is measured 
by the tendency of auditor to give going concern 
opinion. The results of this research show that the 
longer the auditor tenure is, the less independent 
the auditor will be. 
 
Arguments Which Do Not Support Mandatory 
Auditor Rotation 
Studies which show the relation between auditor 
tenure and audit quality were done by Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2002), Johnson (2002), Myers et al. 
(2003), Manry et al. (2003), Carcello and Nagy 
(2004), Ghosh and Moon (2005), Carey and Simnett 
(2006), Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007), Shafie et al. 
(2009), Al-Thuneibat et al. (2010). Most of the stu-
dies in America reject the statement that the dura-
tion of relationship between auditor and client has 
negative effects on audit quality [for example those 
done by Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), Myers et 
al. (2003), Carcello and Nagy (2004), Ghosh and 
Moon (2005)]. 
Opponents of mandatory auditor rotation gen-
erally contends that the existence of mandatory 
auditor rotation increases the fee that has to be con-
sidered by the auditor, that is start-up costs, and 
time that has to be allocated to harmonize with the 
client. It means losing audit efficiency also means 
fee increasing. Arrunada and Paz-Ares (1995b) state 
that auditor will not be able to transfer knowledge 
well to the client because of the rotation. 
 
Auditor Reputation on Auditor Rotation 
Audit quality owned by public accountant can be 
measured from the size of audit firm which does 
auditing process (DeAngelo 1981a). Big Four audi-
tors are regarded to do the auditing process with 
better quality compared to small audit firms or 
Non-Big Four auditors. This is caused by Big Four 
auditors have got more clients and more human 
resources so that they do not rely on a certain client 
or some clients only. Besides, because Big Four au-
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ditors have reputation which is considered good by 
society, they will do the auditing process more 
carefully. 
Mutchler et al. (1997) find the univariate evi-
dence that big six auditors tend to give going con-
cern opinion to companies that face financial dis-
tress rather than non-big six auditors. Auditor with 
big scale can provide better audit quality compared 
to auditor with small scale, including to give going 
concern opinion. DeFond et al. (2002) find the evi-
dence that Big Four auditors are more often to re-
port audit problems in going concern opinion ra-
ther than Non-Big Four auditors. Geiger and Rama 
(2006) tested the different audit quality between Big 
Four auditors and Non-Big Four auditors. The re-
sults show that the error rates type 1 and 2 which 
are made by Big Four auditor are lower than Non-
Big Four auditors. Francis and Yu (2009) find that 
big auditors more likely give going concern opinion 
on audited reports, and the clients of big auditors 
are proved to have less aggressive profit manage-
ment. Furthermore, the first hypothesis is formu-
lated as follows. 
H01: Auditor reputation does not influence auditor 
rotation. 
 
Financial Condition on Auditor Rotation 
Some researchers tested the effects of the conditions 
of financial distresses on auditor rotation have not 
found conclusive results. Companies which face 
financial distress tend to change the auditor com-
pared to those which do not [Schwactz and Menon 
1985, Nasser et al. 2006, Hudaib and Cooke 2005, 
Ismail et al. 2008]. Ismail et al. (2008) find that po-
tential factors of bankruptcy with some financial 
ratios become the diving factors of auditor rotation 
of companies in Malaysia. The research of Hudaib 
and Cooke (2005) on companies listed in London 
Stock Exchange during the period of 1987-2001, 
which states that companies which face financial 
distress tend to receive qualified opinion, so it en-
courage the companies to change the auditor. Whe-
reas, researches done by Sinason et al. (2001), Se-
tyorini & Ardiati (2006), and Prastiwi and Frenawi-
dayuarti (2009) state that company‟s financial con-
dition does not influence auditor rotation. Thus, the 
hypothesis is formulated as follows. 
H02: Client‟s financial condition does not influence 
auditor rotation 
 
Potential Incentive Economy on Auditor Rotation 
Supporters of mandatory auditor rotation generally 
contend that long term auditor-client relationship 
can influence auditor objectivity and independence. 
Some researches, such as those done by DeAngelo 
1981b, Dies & Giroux 1992, O‟Kefee et al. 1994, Ra-
gunathan et al. 1994, state that the existence of rota-
tion can decrease audit failure, push client to adopt 
conservative accounting practice, and produce 
more complete reporting (OCA 1994 in Catanach Jr. 
et al. 1999). 
Hartadi (2009) finds the evidence that fee really 
significantly influences audit quality. Hoitash et al. 
(2007) finds the evidence that when auditor is nego-
tiating with the management about the amount of 
fee which has to be paid by the management as the 
payment of the auditor‟s work, there is a big possi-
bility that there will be reciprocal concession which 
certainly will reduce the quality of the audited re-
ports. This action surely leads to the action of sacri-
ficing professionalism, in which that reciprocal con-
cession will reduce the interests on audit quality 
maintenance. Dhaliwal et al. (2008) find the evidence 
that audit fee significantly influences audit quality. 
Thus, the hypothesis is formulated as follows. 
H03: Potential intensive economy does not influ-
ence auditor rotation. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Data Samples 
This research uses the samples of companies listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 2002-2011. 
The selection on samples is done by purposive sam-
pling along the observable period, considering in 
that period, it is suspected that the phenomena of 
artificial rotations happened before the occurrence of 
Law No. 5 of 2011 on Public Accountant which is 
followed by Government Regulation No. 20 of 2015 
on Public Accountant Practice which is the follow-
up of Law No. 5 of 2011 on Public Accountant. The 
selection of observable period is based on the regula-
tion on mandatory auditor rotation which has just 
been regulated by Minister of Financial in 2002, 
which was then revised in 2003, and revised again in 
2008. During the period, it is suspected that artificial 
auditor rotation happened. 
 
Research Model 
ROTATIONit = a + b1REPit + b2FINANCIALit + 
b3ECOINEit + + εit. (1) 
Description: 
a: constants. 
ROTATIONit: Rotation is a dummy variable which has 
the value of 0 including artificial rotation, and has the 
value of 1 if the rotation is not artificial. 
FINANCIALit: is the financial condition of the company 
which is measured based on Altman model. 
ECOINit : shows potential intensive economy which is 
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got by auditor and measured based on total assets. 
REPit: shows the size of auditor which audits company i 
in t (0 is for Big Four affiliated auditors and 1 is for 
Non-Big Four affiliated auditors. 
b1, b2, b3: coefficient. 
Εit: error. 
 
Operational Variable Definition 
Rotation: shows auditor rotation. The regulation on 
mandatory auditor rotation forces clients to change 
the auditor which is demanded to audit their finan-
cial reports. When it has to change periodically, in 
order to be able to audit the same client(s), auditors 
change their names into a new auditor. If they 
change their name, auditor incumbent is still able to 
audit the same client with a new auditor. That 
means, conceptually, there has been a rotation, but 
substantially the relationship between the auditor 
and the client is still going on, and this is what is 
meant by artificial auditor rotation. Rotation varia-
ble is a dummy variable, which has the value of 0 
for artificial rotation, and the value of 1 for non-
artificial rotation. 
REP: shows auditor reputation variable which 
is measured by using dummy variable. Auditor 
size shows the level of auditor reputation (DeAnge-
lo 1981a, Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007). Auditor 
reputation is seen from the sizes of the auditors, 
which are grouped into 2, there are auditor which 
affiliate with Big 4 and auditor which does not affil-
iate with Big 4. Companies which are audited by 
Big 4 auditor is given he value of 1, whereas com-
panies which are audited by Non-Big 4 auditor is 
given the value of 0. 
FINANCIAL: Financial condition is measured 
by using revised model of Altman (2000), and the 
model can be used to explain financial condition of 
the company. Company‟s financial condition mea-
surement using the model of Revised Z Score Alt-
man, in which Z= 0.717 WCTA + 0.847 RETA + 3.107 
EBIT+ 0.420 BVED + 0.998 SATA. WCTA= working 
capital/total asset, RETA= retained earnings/total 
asset, EBIT= earnings before interest and tax/total 
asset, BVED= book value of equity/book value of 
debt, and SATA= sales/total asset. If the value of Z 
is < 1.21 it is predicted that the company is likely to 
face bankruptcy (black area), which is then given the 
value of 1. If the value of Z is between 1.21 - 2.90, it is 
predicted that the company does not have any guar-
antee to be always stable in their financial condition 
(grey area), which is then given the value of 2. If the 
value of Z is higher than 2.90 it is predicted that the 
company is not likely to be bankrupt (white area), 
which is then given the value of 3. 
ECOIN: Shows potential incentive economy 
that will be received by the auditor, measured by 
total asset. Big companies have high audit complex-
ity. Because of that, the potential of income that will 
be got by the auditor is also high. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
This research uses logistic regression analysis to see 
the effects of auditor reputation, auditor specializa-
tion, potential intensive economy, and client‟s fi-
nancial condition on auditor rotation of companies 
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The use of logit 
model is regarding to the dependent variable which 
is a dichotomy variable, namely artificial rotation 
(with the value of 0) and non-artificial rotation 
(with the value of 1). 
Hypothesis testing using logistic regression 
method in steps described as follows. 
Descriptive analysis. This analysis explains descrip-
tive statistic of each variable. 
Assessing the appropriateness of the logistic re-
gression model using „Hosmer and Lemeshow‟s 
goodness of fit‟ test. If the probability value based 
on goodness of fit test is higher than 0.05, it means 
the regression model is considered appropriate, 
since there is no difference between predictive clas-
sification and conservative classification. 
Analyzing coefficient of determination (Nagelkerke 
R Square) to show variability of independent varia-
ble which can explain variability of dependent va-
riable. 
Analyzing predictive model classification power of 
each group. 
Testing regression coefficient. If the significance 
value is not lower than alpha 5%, statistically H01, 
H02, H03 provided are rejected. 
Before doing logistic regression test, to avoid 
error in model specification, multicolinearity test-
ing is previously done. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The samples of this research were chosen using 
purposive sampling approach. This research takes 
samples of companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during the period of 2002-2011, as many 
as 1831 samples. The data of financial reports were 
taken from the data center of Faculty of Economics 
and Business of Gadjah Mada University. Auditors‟ 
names, partners‟ names, and auditors‟ affiliations 
were taken from the website of Indonesian Public 
Accountant Association. The samples are shown in 
Table 1. 
Financial conditions of the clients are meas-
ured based on Altman model (2000) and the value 
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of Z is gained as shown in Table 2. 
Then, based on the samples, there shows that 
most of go public companies are audited by big 
audit firms (affiliated with Big Four audit firms) on 
Table 3. 
 
Multicolinearity 
Good regression model is a model that does not 
contain multicolinearity, of which there is no corre-
lation between their independent variables. Multi-
colinearity test on the data can be seen from the 
value of VIF (Variance Inflation Factor). If VIF val-
ue is less than 10, it can be concluded that there is 
no correlation between the independent variables 
or multicolinearity does not exist. Based on the test 
on Table 4, it is known that VIF value < 10. That 
means there is no multicolinearity problem on the 
model of the research. 
 
Model Classification 
According to the analysis which shows the Nagel-
kerke R Square value of 0.075, it means that reputa-
tion variable, financial condition, and potential 
intensive economy can explain 7.5% of auditor rota-
tion types, and the rest is explained by other fac-
tors. The value of Hosmer and Lemeshow‟s good-
ness of fit is 0.127, which is more than 0.05. This 
indicates that regression model is seen appropriate, 
because there is no difference between predictive 
classification and observable classification. All the 
models are able to classify auditor rotation of 77%. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The tests on hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 are based on the 
results of logistic regression test as what is shown 
on Table 5. According to Table 5, it can be seen that 
the variable of REP (auditor reputation) shows 
coefficient value of 1.106 with p value of 0.000. Be-
cause the p value is not more than alpha 0.05 hypo-
theses which states that auditor reputation does not 
influence auditor rotation is rejected. 
This means clients audited by the auditors 
which affiliate with the Big Four tend to have artifi-
cial auditor rotation(s). If it is seen from client distri-
bution, it shows that 54.2% of them chose auditor 
which affiliate with the Big Four. Company com-
plexity needs a good audit quality to make the pub-
lished financial reports are trusted by public. Thus, 
company client feels more comfortable and has more 
trust if the company is audited by a big audit firm 
(Big Four affiliated). Since clients feel comfortable 
with a big audit firm, the clients tend to maintain the 
auditor in order to be audited by the same auditor. 
This comfortable relationship can also be seen from 
Table 1 
Sample Description 
Description Amount 
Companies published financial statements in 2002-2011 2909 
Companies with incomplete data 1078 
Companies published financial statements in succession in 2002-2011 with complete data 1831 
Companies with no auditor rotation 1284 
Companies which have done auditor rotation, in this case the new auditor was not the same auditor 
that only changed the name of the firm, and the affiliation was also changed. 
125 
Companies which have done auditor rotation, in this case the new auditor was the same auditor that 
only changed the name of the firm, and the affiliation kept going. 
419 
Companies which were audited by an auditor in a certain period of time and after a year break the 
companies were audited by the same auditor again. 
3 
Total company samples 1831 
 
Table 2 
Clients’ Financial Condition 
Condition Frequency Percentage (%) Cumulative Percentage (%) 
Distress 789 43.1 43.1 
Grey Area 632 34.5 77.6 
Non-Distress 410 22.4 100.0 
Total 1831 100.0  
 
Table 3 
Auditor Description 
Auditor Frequency Percentage (%) Cumulative Percentage (%) 
Non-Big Four Affiliated 838 45.8 45.8 
Big Four Affiliated 993 54.2 100.0 
Total 1831 100.0  
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the side of the auditor. When auditing the same 
client, auditor will feel more efficient from the side 
of expense because the auditor has known deeper 
about the client‟s condition. Besides, big audit firms 
usually do some big investments for their human 
resource developments to be able to audit well. Be-
cause of that, the human resources will be more pro-
fessional in auditing certain industries since the 
company clients are not likely to change. It is surely 
in line with the statements of DeAngelo (1981a) that 
the quality of audit which is done by a public ac-
countant can be seen from the size of audit firm 
which does auditing process, whether it is a big au-
dit firm or Big Four Auditor, which is considered 
will do more qualified auditing process rather than 
small audit firm or Non-Big Four Auditor. 
FINANCIAL variable (financial condition) 
shows p value of 0.615 which is bigger than alpha 
0.05. This indicates that financial condition does not 
significantly influence auditor rotation. This result 
is different with the findings of Ismail et al. (2008), 
and Hudaib and Cooke (2005), of which potential 
factors of bankruptcy with the standards of some 
financial ratios become encouraging factors of audi-
tor rotation to happen in a company. However, this 
research supports the statements of Sinason et al. 
(2001), Setyorini and Ardiati (2006), and Prastiwi 
and Frenawidayuarti (2009), which state that finan-
cial condition does not influence the rotation of 
auditor. Companies which face financial distress 
want to be audited by the same auditor in a longer 
period, since the auditor has got better understand-
ing on the financial conditions of the companies. 
Furthermore, the factor of potential incentive 
economy (ECOIN) shows the p value of 0.169 
which is also bigger than alpha 0.05. It indicates 
that this variable does not significantly influence 
auditor rotation. Statistically, there are not enough 
evidences that potential intensive economy influ-
ences artificial auditor rotation. This is very possi-
ble that the fee or client service which is got by the 
auditor of which it has no standardization becomes 
the factor that causes the difficulties to exactly 
measure the effects of it towards auditor rotation. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This research empirically studies the phenomena of 
artificial auditor rotations in Indonesia. Although 
there has been a regulation on mandatory auditor 
rotation, there are only a few researches that un-
cover artificial auditor rotation. Based on the results 
of this research, auditor rotation is statistically sig-
nificant in influencing auditor rotation. This re-
search is expected to deepen the concept of audit 
quality and in practical to give inputs to the regula-
tion on auditor rotation. Auditor rotation supposes 
to show the real rotation of auditor. This finding is 
in line with the Law No. 5 of 2011 on Public Ac-
countant which is followed by Government Regula-
tion No. 20 of 2015 on Public Accountant Regula-
tion. At the end of the day, what is regulated in 
there is public accountant rotation and not auditor 
rotation, in which a public accountant can audit the 
client for no more than 5 (five) years in succession. 
This research takes the samples by purposive 
sampling, so that the results cannot be generalized 
on different sample setting. Furthermore, this re-
search only tests three factors that are suspected 
statistically influence auditor rotation. It is very 
possible that there are other suspected factors that 
influence auditor rotation, such as going concern 
opinion. Other than that, the occurrences of Law No. 
5 of 2011 on Public Accountant and Government 
Regulation No. 20 of 2015 are needed to be studied 
on the effectiveness in creating audit quality. 
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